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In most areas of economic regulation, the movement toward greater state
autonomy has been associated with deregulation both as a theoretical and as a
political matter. In theory, devolution encourages deregulation by giving
individual states discretion to relax the uniform rules typical of federal
regulatory programs. Not surprisingly, state empowerment has found favor
among politicians looking for ways to roll back intrusive federal economic
regulation.
In the case of financial regulation, however, this convergence between
devolution and deregulation has been absent. State empowerment frequently has
resulted in increased regulatory burdens on financial institutions, requiring
federal preemption to achieve deregulation. This Article will analyze several
examples of this phenomenon, provide some possible reasons for the anomaly,
and describe the dilemma that it has created for financial regulatory reform.
I. REGULAmTRY COMPEITION, BANK CHARTERING,
AND THE RACE To DEREGULATE
In financial regulation, the appeal of devolution is not new. Competition for
regulatory authority between federal and state sovereigns has flavored the
history of regulation of banks, insurance companies and even securities firms.
Although questions of federalism were largely resolved decades ago in the
areas of insurance and securities regulation-insurance regulation was left
primarily to the states by virtue of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,I while
securities regulation became primarily the responsibility of the federal
Securities and Exchange Commission 2 -bank regulation is characterized by an
t Professor of Law, Rutgers-Newark. A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Harvard University.
1. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994). Adopted in 1945, McCarran-Ferguson
was Congress's answer to the Supreme Court's ruling that insurance was interstate commerce in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). McCarran-Ferguson restored
regulatory autonomy to the states except in cases of express federal preemption.
2. Created in 1934, the SEC administers six federal statutes governing the public issuance, transfer
and trading of investment securities. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a to 77aa (1994);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a to 7811(1994); Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79a to 79z-6 (1994); Trust Indenture Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa to 77bbbb
(1994); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1994); Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa to 7811(1994); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, P.L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737-64 (amending Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
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uneasy sharing of power among competing regulatory authorities. Banks may
choose between a state and a national charter and, despite a significant overlay
of federal regulation, the chartering authority remains responsible for
determining the mix of available powers and privileges. Since bank chartering
law specifies the businesses into which banking firms may diversify,3 the menu
of powers offered by different chartering authorities has a potentially
significant effect on bank profitability.
Standard economic analysis of this "dual banking system" has borrowed
from corporate law models of competition among the states for corporate
charters, often referred to as the "race to the bottom"4 (or, from another
perspective, the "race to the top"5). The dual banking system is seen as
creating an auction for bank charters that roughly mirrors the rivalry among
states for corporate charters.6 Interstate rivalry for bank charters is assumed
to be minimal because banks cannot opt among state chartering authorities as
costlessly as nonbank firms.' National chartering restores the option to choose
between at least two competing chartering authorities offering different menus
of bank powers.
This competitive model of bank chartering assumes that, first, banks can
Act of 1934). Congress preserved the right of states to regulate securities transactions within their
borders, see 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994), but the national scope of most securities transactions ensures the
primacy of the federal regulatory scheme.
3. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (para. seventh) (1994) (limiting national banks to certain enumerated
powers and "such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking"); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 96 (McKinney 1990) (limiting powers of New York state-chartered banks to those
expressly granted by New York banking law).
4. "Race to the bottom" theorists argue that the freedom of business entities to chose their state of
incorporation without federal interference encourages competition among states for chartering revenues.
To attract charters, states offer corporate managers business-friendly regulatory regimes, weakening
legal restraints on managerial discretion. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (finding that the decline of corporate standards
largely stems from a move to the least common denominator).
5. "Race to the top" theorists accept the model of state charter competition but view the resulting
regulatory equilibrium as efficient, producing in most cases the optimal set of legal rules governing
corporate conduct. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STtD. 251 (1977) (finding state regulation to be superior to federal).
6. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
7. In the past, the main barrier to interstate competition for bank charters was state law prohibiting
interstate branching, which required banks to locate their deposit-taking facilities within their chartering
jurisdiction. Since relocation was costly, banks had no credible threat of exit that could be used to
extract more favorable laws from their chartering state. In practice, however, banking firms that were
dissatisfied with their chartering state did find an escape route: they could charter a new bank in a
friendlier jurisdiction and transfer non-deposit operations and jobs to the new state, a tactic that was used
by the banking industry in the late 1970s to bargain for favorable changes in state usury laws. See
Robert A. Burgess & Monica A. Ciolfi, Experimentation or Exploitation? A State Regulator's View of
Interstate Credit Cord Transactions, 42 BUS. LAw. 929 (1987) (noting this trend in credit card
solicitation). Moreover, now that interstate branching is becoming a reality (thanks to federal
preemption, see infra Section II.B), banks should be able to shop for state charters almost as easily as
nonbank firms.
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shift between a national and state charter without prohibitive transaction costs'
and, second, banks will shop for the menu of powers and privileges that
maximizes firm value. Chartering authorities in turn are presumed to have
incentives to make their laws more attractive in order to attract more charters. 9
Thus, competition between national and state chartering authorities should
encourage regulatory experimentation. Since most banks will choose the set of
rules that permits them the most flexibility in setting investment policy, the
legal equilibrium that results from chartering competition should be deregula-
tory, as "race to the bottom/race to the top" theories would predict. 0
A dissenting view of the dual banking system also begins with the corporate
model of competition for charters, but concludes that competition for bank
charters is weak or nonexistent due to the overlay of federal regulation."
Banks that choose a state charter become subject to federal regulation anyway
if they join the Federal Reserve system or participate in federal deposit
insurance, 2 now mandatory under the laws of many states."' Since the
8. See Scott, supra note 6, at 9 (citing right to switch charters as key element of the dual banking
system).
9. Charters produce rents in the form of chartering fees and related revenues; therefore, chartering
authorities have incentives to vie for market share. The competitive model of bank chartering assumes
that the national chartering authority (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, part of the Treasury
Department) has the same incentives as the states to maximize charter revenues, or at least will respond
to charter losses by making the national chartering option more attractive. See Scott, supra note 6, at
33. As Section UI.A will discuss, the Comptroller's office has a stake in attracting or retaining bank
charters; lost charters (and lost charter fees) mean smaller budgets and fewer employees. See also Justin
Fox, In Blow to OCC, N.Y. Megabank Decides to Go With a State Charter, AM. BANKER, Aug. 31,
1995, at 1 (describing financial impact of significant charter defections on Comptroller's budget and
staff). Recent anecdotal evidence confirms that the national chartering authority will behave like a classic
rent-seeker when competing with the states for bank charters. See, e.g., Justin Fox, Stampede Toward
State Charters Makes the OCC Change Its Tune, AM. BANKER, Aug. 28, 1995, at 3 (describing efforts
by the Comptroller to halt charter defections by making national bank regulation more "user friendly").
10. Deregulation has not always been the outcome of the competition for corporate charters, as
"race to the top" adherents have recognized. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery,
Regulatory Competition. Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1861,
1881 (1995) (citing state antitakeover legislation as an example of charter market failure). Moreover,
since financial regulation performs a signalling function and reassures cautious investors and customers
as to the safety of financial institutions, the optimal regulatory equilibrium may never be zero regulation.
Nevertheless, most proponents of the competitive story assume that banks remain overregulated rather
than underregulated, leaving room for competition by deregulation. See Scott, supra note 6, at 36
(predicting that regulatory competition will lead to legal regime that offers banks broader operating
authority and lowered constraints on profitability).
11. E.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1
(1987); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System,
73 CORNELL L. REv. 677 (1988) (arguing federal preemption and uniformity are stronger than
competitive forces).
12. Participation in these federal programs subjects banks to different federal regulators: the Federal
Reserve supervises state-chartered banks that join the Federal Reserve system (member banks), while
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation supervises state-chartered insured nonmember banks. For a
description of this division of regulatory authority and its implications for the regulatory competition
story, see Scott, supra note 6, at 5-8.
13. For examples see infra note 72.
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federal government, unlike the states, bears much of the cost of bank
failure,14 federal regulators are more interested in preserving bank safety and
soundness than in making their regulation more banker friendly." The result
will be overly restrictive federal regulation that preempts state experimentation
with broader bank powers.
Although these two views of the dual banking system differ as to the degree
of regulatory competition that can be expected, they concur that the likely
effect of greater devolution is greater deregulation. Both approaches assume
that states will be responsive to banks' demand for greater investment
opportunities so long as they have a real opportunity to compete for charters
free from national interference. Therefore, enhancing state authority over banks
should encourage deregulation.
II. DEVOLUTION, REREGULATION, AND THE DEMAND FOR PREEMPTION
Although the competitive story would predict that increasing state autonomy
should improve regulatory competition, leading the way to deregulation, to the
extent that devolution has taken place in bank regulation, the result has been
the opposite. On balance, state regulation has proved more restrictive than
federal regulation, requiring federal preemption to force deregulation. There
have been exceptions: states such as South Dakota and Delaware have adopted
explicitly deregulatory policies in order to attract bank charters,1 6 while
Congress occasionally has preempted state experimentation.1 7 Nevertheless,
the trend has been the other way, and never so clearly as in the mid-1990s as
devolution and deregulation have become important priorities for both Congress
and the Clinton administration. This essay will look at four examples of this
anomaly.
A. Bank Powers
Initially, a bank's menu of powers is determined by its chartering authority.
Federal regulatory authorities such as the Federal Reserve and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation may further limit bank powers by restricting the
investments and activities of their member banks in order to protect the safety
14. This is the consequence of federal deposit insurance and the federal banking agencies'
prominent role in administering failing banks. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 347b (1994) (giving Federal
Reserve authority to make liquidity loans to troubled banks).
15. Both the Federal Reserve and the FDIC collect fees for services from their members and
therefore have at least some incentive to compete for banks by making membership more attractive.
Moreover, each agency's stable of banks constitutes a powerful constituency that may help enhance the
agency's reputation and clout in Congress, leading to favorable funding outcomes. These factors suggest
that federal regulators may not act monolithically and that some interagency competition for banks may
take place at the federal level.
16. See infra Section nl.B.
17. See infra note 19.
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and soundness of the banking system. In addition, Congress occasionally has
acted to bar specific conduct by banks. The most famous examples are the
1933 Glass-Steagall Act, 8 which limited bank participation in the securities
business, and Title VI of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982,19 which barred affiliates of banks from most aspects of the insurance
business.
Compared to laws governing nonbanking firms, laws governing bank
diversification historically have been restrictive regardless of their source. Most
banks have been limited to the traditional banking business and related
activities determined to be incidental to the business of banking.' Banks have
been excluded not only from obviously "nonbanking" activities such as oil
exploration2' but also from financial businesses such as securities underwrit-
in? and insurance.
Recent competitive pressure from rival financial firms and foreign banks
has made diversification a priority for the banking industry. The industry's
principal concern has been its inability to expand into other financial
businesses. In recent years, national policy makers have become increasingly
sympathetic to bankers' desire to diversify. In 1991, for example, the Treasury
Department proposed a comprehensive restructuring of federal financial
regulation to permit affiliations between banks, securities firms, and insurance
18. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (para. seventh), 78, 377, 378 (1994). Although some prohibitions apply only
to Federal Reserve member banks, Glass-Steagall's ban on deposit-taking by firms engaged in the
business of corporate securities underwriting (Section 21) affects all banks regardless of charter or
Federal Reserve membership, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1994).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994). Garn-St Germain amended the Bank Holding Company Act,
which empowers the Federal Reserve Board to specify the menu of powers available to bank holding
companies and their nonbank subsidiaries, to stop the Board from allowing bank affiliates to sell
insurance other than credit-related insurance, thereby avoiding a conflict with state laws barring
affiliations between banks and insurance firms. The permissibility of insurance sales by banks themselves
presents a different legal issue; generally, the laws of the relevant chartering authority govern. See
Independent Ins. Agents of Am. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 1275 (2d
Cir. 1989). But see infra text accompanying notes 36-38 (describing states' attempts to regulate national
bank insurance sales within their jurisdictions).
20. Traditional activities include discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, and bills of
exchange; receiving deposits; buying and selling exchange, coin, or bullion; lending money; and
obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (para. seventh) (1994). See also United States
v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326-27 n.5 (1963) (describing mix of related services and
credit devices that comprise traditional banking business, including secured and unsecured loans,
installment financing, credit cards, deposits, estate planning and trusteeship, safety deposit boxes,
foreign acceptances and letters of credit, correspondent services, and investment advice).
21. E.g., Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 668 F.2d 732 (3d Cir.
1982).
22. See supra note 18.
23. See supra note 19. There is an enormous body of literature, much of it critical, that seeks to
describe and explain the history of U.S. bank asset regulation, which is significantly more restrictive
than the banking laws of other jurisdictions, especially Germany. For two assessments of the U.S.
approach from differing perspectives, see Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and
Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314 (1990); Stephen
K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481 (1988).
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companies.24
Although the Treasury's scheme fell victim to pressure on Congress to
resolve the thrift crisis,2 by the mid-1990s conditions appeared more
favorable for federal banking reform, particularly repeal of the Glass-Steagall
Act. First, Republican gains in the 1994 mid-term congressional elections
meant that the new Chairman of the House Banking Committee was Represen-
tative Jim Leach of Iowa, a respected banking expert who was committed to
Glass-Steagall reform.' Second, Glass-Steagall reform was a bipartisan
issue;' even the Clinton administration had endorsed reform in principle.28
Finally, Representative Leach's proposed legislation,29 which expanded bank
securities powers without making radical changes in the federal regulatory
structure,30 had the support of the Federal Reserve and key players in both the
banking and securities industries.3 When the American Banker, a leading
trade journal of the financial industry, asked, "Will 1995 be the year that the
Glass-Steagall Act finally tumbles?" 32 many observers were cautiously
optimistic.
At the same time, federal bank regulators were responding to bankers'
demand for greater powers. The Comptroller of the Currency, the Treasury
Department official charged with overseeing national banks, was interpreting
national banking laws to enlarge the menu of powers available to national
banks, especially insurance-related powers. In 1990, the Comptroller's office
concluded that the sale of annuities by national banks was incidental to the
business of banking and did not constitute a prohibited insurance activity, an
interpretation upheld by the Supreme Court.33 The Comptroller also read 12
24. See U.S. Department of Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: U.S. Treasury
Department Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (Feb.
14, 1991).
25. The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, contained none
of the Treasury's structural reforms and focused primarily on improving bank capital levels and
strengthening regulatory authority over troubled banks.
26. See Suzanna Andrews, Banking on Jim Leach, INSTrITUONAL INVESTOR, June 1995, at 11.
27. See Martha M. Canan, Battle Over Banks' Role in Securities Is a Clash of Viewpoints, Not of
Parties, BoND BUYER, Oct. 17, 1994, at 3.
28. See Ron Scherer, Clinton Proposes a Brave New Banking World, CHRISTIAN Sdl. MONITOR
ONE, Mar. 1, 1995, at 1.
29. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, H.R. 1062, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
30. H.R. 1062 required most new securities activities to be conducted through bank holding
company affiliates separated by firewalls from deposit-taking operations and regulated by the Federal
Reserve. This organizational structure had already been used by the Federal Reserve to permit limited
entry by bank holding companies into the underwriting business. C)f. J.P. Morgan & Co. et al., 75 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 192 (1989) (Federal Reserve decision allowing banks to engage in limited amounts of
securities underwriting through separately incorporated affiliates).
31. Banks, Securities Companies Exploring Links; Legislation: Administration and Congress Are
Looking Into Easing or Repealing 60-Year-Old Restrictions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1995, at 10.
32. Robert Garsson, Glass-Steagall Won't Go Quietly, So Expect Reform But Not Outright Repeal,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 1994, at 3.
33. Nationsbank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
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U.S.C. § 92 of the national banking laws,34 a 1916 provision that authorized
national banks located in small towns to act as insurance agents, to allow those
banks to market insurance products to customers nationwide.
35
Thus, by the mid-1990s, a movement toward expansion of bank powers was
underway at the national level. Ironically, however, the principal barrier to
accomplishing deregulation was the concurrent movement in Congress to return
regulatory authority to the states. While the national sovereign was broadening
the menu of powers available to national banks, many states had moved in the
opposite direction, creating legal barriers between banking and insurance.36
These state laws were in direct conflict with the national chartering authority's
attempts to expand bank powers and ran counter to the national trend to
deregulate bank activities.
Not all states chose to impose more restrictions on banks than the national
sovereign. Some, notably California, South Dakota, and Delaware, moved to
expand bank powers to allow entry into the insurance business.37 Neverthe-
less, in 1995 one third of the states, including all six New England states, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Florida, placed greater limits on bank
insurance activities than those governing national banks.
38
These restrictive state laws had two effects on efforts at the national level
34. For the pertinent portion of 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988), see infra note 41.
35. See NBD Bank v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995); Independent Ins. Agents v. Ludwig,
997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding Comptroller's interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92).
36. Many of these state laws predated the most recent movement by the national sovereign to
expand bank insurance powers; for example, Florida's prohibition on affiliations between banks and
insurance agents was enacted in 1974. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.988 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996).
Florida's statute was adopted in response to an earlier movement at the national level, this time initiated
by the Federal Reserve, to expand the powers of bank holding companies to enter the insurance
business. See Florida Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 591 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1979). The states eventually won this battle when Congress amended the Bank Holding
Company Act to prevent the Federal Reserve from approving new insurance powers for bank holding
companies, see supra note 19. When the Comptroller of the Currency's policies posed a new threat to
state insurance regulation in the 1990s, some states saw the need to reaffirm their opposition to bank
insurance activities. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:121B(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996)
(restrictions on bank insurance activities reenacted and strengthened); Ky. House Res. 91-55-BR-63 (Jan.
31, 1991) (restrictions on bank insurance activities reaffirmed).
37. In 1988, California voters approved Proposition 103, which repealed prohibitions on bank entry
into the insurance business. See CalFarm Insurance Co. v. Deulanejian, 48 Cal. App. 3d 805 (1989)
(upholding constitutionality of portions of Proposition 103); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 51A-4-4
(1990) (allowing state chartered banks to engage full insurance activities); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 761(a)(14) (1993) (same with the exception of title insurance).
38. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-755 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.988 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.030(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:121B(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 1514-A(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 174E (West 1987 & Supp.
1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 683A.110 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 384:16-b(I1) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:3C-1 (West 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1424-
(B)(6) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 281(b) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-3-
46 to 47 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-6-201(a) (1994); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.07-3 5(h)
(West 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4811(a) (1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31A-8C-1, 31A-8C-2(f) (Supp.
1994).
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to achieve financial deregulation. First, they created a legal conflict as state and
national sovereigns vied for primary authority to control bank entry into the
insurance business. Second, they ignited a political conflict that threatened to
derail efforts to achieve broader financial deregulation at the federal level.
1. The Legal Conflict
The divergent positions taken by national and many state sovereigns over
the permissibility of bank insurance activities reopened questions of federalism
that seemingly were resolved decades ago. Relying on the McCarran-Ferguson
Act,39 which restored autonomy to the states over the regulation of insurance,
states claimed the power to bar all banks, whether state or nationally chartered,
from engaging in the insurance business within their borders." This would
permit individual states to block efforts by the Comptroller of the Currency to
attract charters by offering national banks broader insurance powers than those
available under state law. Put another way, devolution would trump regulatory
competition.
This conflict emerged in the mid-1990s when national banks, in reliance on
the Comptroller's interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92, proposed to use small town
branches as vehicles to sell insurance. Section 92 permits national banks with
offices in small towns (defined as towns with 5,000 or fewer inhabitants) to act
as insurance agents.41 The Comptroller ruled that national banks could use
their small town branches as a base to sell insurance to customers anywhere,
an interpretation of section 92 that as of 1995 had been upheld by the two
appellate courts that had considered the question. 42
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994).
40. The state statutes cited in note 38, supra, barred affiliations between an insurance agent licensed
to conduct an in-state insurance business and any banking organization regardless of charter. State
legislatures claimed to derive legal authority to regulate the activities and affiliations of banks chartered
by the national sovereign from state power to set the qualifications of licensed insurance agents; in
exercising this power to prevent banks from affiliating with insurance agents, state legislatures cited the
need to protect consumers from coercive tying arrangements (when borrowers are forced to buy
insurance as a condition to obtaining bank credit), conflicts of interest, and other unfair trade practices.
For example, Florida's antiaffiliation statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.988 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996),
appeared in the state's Unfair Trade Practices Act, the purpose of which, according to the legislature,
was to "regulate trade practices relating to the business of insurance in accordance with [the McCarran-
Ferguson Act] by defining ... all such practices in this state which constitute unfair methods of
competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or
determined." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.951 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996).
41. The section reads in pertinent part:
[Any [national bank] association located and doing business in any place the
population of which does not exceed five thousand habitants ... . may, under such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the
agent for any fire, life or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the
State in which said bank is located to do business in said State, by soliciting and selling
insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by such company ....
12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
42. See supra note 35 and sources cited therein.
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In response, insurance officials in several states moved to block national
banks from selling insurance under local laws barring banks or their affiliates
from acting as insurance agents.43 Insurance officials argued that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act immunized state laws regulating the business of insurance
from federal preemption.' Since McCarran-Ferguson exempts acts of
Congress that specifically relate to the business of insurance, however, national
banks argued that 12 U.S.C. § 92 preempted state insurance laws.45
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved this conflict between McCarran-
Ferguson and the national banking laws in favor of the national banks.' As
a result, national banks will be free to act as insurance agents through their
small town branches, but the clash between chartering authorities is likely to
continue. States may still claim the power to bar national banks from other
aspects of the insurance business, such as insurance underwriting, that are not
specifically authorized by federal statute. The Comptroller may still try to
facilitate national bank entry into all facets of the insurance business by
classifying those activities as among the incidental powers of national banks.47
Thus, because of a congressional decision to cede regulatory power over
insurance to the states, full bank entry into the insurance business may be
achieved only through one of three legal routes. First, the Comptroller of the
Currency and national banks may continue to wage costly piecemeal legal
battles over the reach of restrictive state law, counting on the federal courts to
limit state autonomy. Second, states may be persuaded to follow the lead of the
Comptroller and dismantle barriers to bank entry into the insurance business.
Finally, Congress may adopt preemptive legislation returning regulatory
authority over insurance to the national sovereign, freeing the Comptroller to
43. See Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (1 th Cir. 1995) rev. sub
nonL Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Sup. Ct. Docket No. 94-1837 (decided Mar.
26, 1996); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994); First Advantage Ins. v.
Green, 652 So. 2d 562 (La. Ct. App., 1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 654 So. 2d 331 (La. 1995).
44. See Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Sup. Ct. Docket No. 94-1837 (Brief for
Respondents Bill Nelson and the Florida Department of Insurance); see also supra note 40.
45. The relevant portion of McCarran-Ferguson states that, "No Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance .... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
46. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Sup. Ct. Docket No. 94-1837 (decided Mar.
26, 1996) (holding that section 92 "specifically relates to the business of insurance" within the meaning
of McCarran-Ferguson). Although the Court did not directly address the power of states to place
conditions on national banks functioning as insurance agents (such as state licensing requirements), the
Court's reading of section 92 suggests that states may not apply local regulations that would significantly
interfere with national banks' exercise of insurance agency powers.
47. Cf. NationsBank, 115 S. Ct. 810 (upholding Comptroller's ruling that sale of annuities falls
within the incidental powers of national banks). The Comptroller's assault on restrictive state regulation
is not limited to insurance. In 1995, the national sovereign authorized national banks to ignore state laws
requiring bank trust departments to maintain in-state headquarters, thereby challenging state autonomy
over local trust business. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, OCC Ruling Lets Bank Trust Units Go
Interstate, AM. BANKER, Dec. 26, 1995, at 1.
Yale Law & Policy Review
continue to expand national bank powers.
2. The Political Conflict
While national banks counted on the federal courts to limit the reach of
restrictive state law, supporters of bank insurance restrictions looked to
Congress to reaffirm state autonomy by curbing the authority of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency to grant broader powers to banks than were allowed by
state law. In this effort, they had the support of congressional architects of
devolution who were philosophically opposed to any expansion of federal
regulatory power, even when the national sovereign was using its power to
deregulate banks.
In 1995, proponents of devolution halted the progress of two popular
deregulatory initiatives that had nothing to do with bank insurance powers: the
long-awaited Glass-Steagall reform bill48 and a regulatory relief bill.49
Defenders of state autonomy (who included important members of the House
leadership) insisted that any banking reform legislation include a moratorium
on the Comptroller of the Currency's authority to grant national banks new
insurance powers.50 In response, many banks withdrew their support for the
reform bills despite the promise of new securities powers.51 The Comptroller
of the Currency called upon national banks to defeat the legislation.5"
The turf wars between the banking and insurance industries that sparked
these legal and political battles are certainly nothing new. Banks want to enter
the insurance business; insurance agents want to keep banks out. Both are
likely to try to achieve their goals by influencing legislative outcomes.53 What
is new is the emerging philosophical conflict between the ideals of deregulation
and devolution as applied to financial regulation. Devolution promised to
48. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, H.R. 1062, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
49. Financial Institutions Regulatory Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 1858, 104th Cong., lstSess. (1995).
Both bills were reintroduced as a single package in H.R. 2520, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995). ,
50. Supporters of the moratorium included House Rules Committee Chairman Gerald Solomon (R-
NY), Commerce Committee Chairman Thomas Bliley (R-VA), and the Commerce Committee's ranking
minority member John Dingell (D-MI). Since these committees could prevent financial legislation from
reaching the floor of the House, Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach had to take their concerns
seriously. In September 1995, in a compromise worked out between Speaker Newt Gingrich and the
three committee chairman, Leach agreed to include the moratorium in his banking reform package and
to drop an amendment sponsored by Representative Richard Baker that would have preempted all state
antiaffiliation laws and permitted bank-insurance links. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Regulatory Relief
Bill Advancing, At a Price, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1995, at 1.
51. Bill McConnell, 36 CEOs Urge Gingrich to KillInsurance Curbs, AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1995,
at 1.
52. Jaret Seiberg, Comptroller To Bankers: Insurance Sales Crucial, AM. BANKER, Oct. 10, 1995,
at 1. The Comptroller had independent reasons to object to the Glass-Steagall reform bill considered by
Congress in 1995. H.R. 1062 required securities activities to be conducted through bank holding
company affiliates, see supra note 30. Under the current division of federal regulatory authority, bank
holding company affiliates are supervised by the Federal Reserve, not the Comptroller.
53. See infra Section IlI.C for a more complete description of this bargaining process.
Vol. 14:65, 1996
The Paradox of Financial Reform
accelerate the deregulatory process by freeing states to experiment. Yet true
financial deregulation may require extensive federal preemption that will
impose the kinds of uniform national standards that prevent state experimenta-
tion.
This result is at odds with the standard story of regulatory competition in
either its strong or its weak form. The strong version suggests that competition
among national and state chartering authorities should produce an equilibrium
that will be at least somewhat deregulatory. Theoretically, if the national
sovereign expands bank insurance powers in order to attract bank charters, the
states must follow suit in order to retain bank charters. Rather than producing
an equilibrium, however, regulatory competition appears to be encouraging
wide variations in regulatory approach as the national and some state
sovereigns pursue diverging and occasionally conflicting policies. Equilibrium
can be achieved only by federal preemption that puts an end to regulatory
competition.'
This result is equally inconsistent with the weak version of the competitive
story, which assumes that meaningful competition for bank charters is stifled
by federal regulation that is more concerned with protecting bank safety than
with attracting bank charters. To the contrary, regulatory competition between
state and national sovereigns appears to be taking place, but the national
sovereign has been more responsive than many states to banks' demand for
regulatory flexibility. Increasing state autonomy will preserve regulatory
barriers between banking and insurance, while broad federal preemption may
free banks to diversify.
B. Interstate Banking
Historically, geographical expansion by both national and state-chartered
banks was under state control. States had the power to determine where and
when their banks could establish branches. National banks were subject to the
branching laws of the state in which their principal operations were located.55
Neither national banks nor state member banks could open branches outside of
54. Alternatively, federal preemption may be necessary to force the states to participate in the kind
of regulatory competition that the competitive story predicts. Many states do not want to mix banking
with insurance, but if they cannot prevent national banks from selling insurance within their borders,
they at least want to extend the same benefits to state-chartered banks. Under state "wild card" statutes,
once the courts rule definitively that national banks may sell a particular product, such as annuities,
state-chartered banks automatically enjoy the same privileges. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.061
(West 1984 & Supp. 1996); see also Jaret Seiberg, Docket: Fla. Ruling May Hold Key to Insurance
Power, AM. BANKER, Aug. 30, 1995, at 3. The result is a form of regulatory equilibrium, but it is
hardly the outcome of free charter competition. States deregulate reluctantly, and only to the extent that
they are precluded by preemption from applying their restrictive laws to national banks.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1994).
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their home states.56 States were even given the authority to prevent acquisi-
tions of banks in their jurisdictions by out-of-state bank holding companiesY
As a result, interstate banking was restricted despite innovations such as
automatic deposit, banking by mail, and automated teller machines that
increased the mobility of the deposit business.5"
The longevity of interstate branching restrictions reflected the political skill
of generations of advocates of devolution. Between 192459 and 1993,
Congress repeatedly considered but rejected proposed legislation that would
have permitted nationwide branching by national banks free from state interfer-
ence."o The congressional decision to defer to state branching law allowed
local jurisdictions to block the growth of nationwide banking operations,
thereby protecting small local banks from competition. 6'
Recently, however, the national sovereign has actively intervened to
dismantle state barriers to geographical diversification. The Comptroller of the
Currency began the process by encouraging national banks to use an obscure
provision of the national banking laws to relocate their main offices across state
lines.' In 1994, Congress finally passed legislation preempting most state
56. Id. Theoretically, states could allow nonmember banks to open interstate branches, but few did
-at least until federal preemption made interstate banking inevitable. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Too Big
to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOwA L. REv. 957, 963 n.16
(1992); see infra note 63 and accompanying text.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988). In 1994, Pub. L. 103-328 amended § 1842(d) to authorize the
Board to approve acquisitions of banks located in a State other than the home state of the acquiring
bank, regardless of state laws, if the acquiring bank is adequately capitalized and managed. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1994).
58. In some cases, the legality of these innovations depended on legal findings that they did not
constitute actual bank branches. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n of N.Y. State v. Marine Midland
Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (1985).
59. Congress was forced to address the interstate banking issue in 1924 because the Supreme Court
had ruled that national banks had no clear statutory authority to establish branches when state laws
prohibit branch banks. See First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
60. The McFadden Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1228 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994)),
empowered national banks to establish branches in the municipalities in which their main office was
located so long as state law gave similar branching authority to state-chartered banks. The Banking Act
of 1933, 48 Stat. 189 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 36 (c)(2) (1994)), empowered national banks
to branch anywhere within their home state, but, again, only if state law gave similar branching
privileges to state-chartered banks. Although Congress's intent appears to have been to achieve
competitive equality between state and national banks, see First National Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966), the legislative history suggests a different explanation: large national
banks, national bank regulators, and other supporters of a national banking system were repeatedly
frustrated in their effort to achieve unrestricted branching powers for national banks by a powerful
political coalition of small unit banks, local businesses, and congressional supporters of state autonomy.
See Wilmarth, supra note 56, at 972-75.
61. See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. S. 9892 (May 10, 1932) (statement of Senator Carter Glass (D-VA)).
Glass, a strong advocate of interstate banking, accused his opponents of attempting to protect local
monopolies over credit from competition from new bank entrants.
62. E.g., Decision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Applications of First
Fidelity Bank, N.A., Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., and First Fidelity Bank, N.A., New Jersey,
Newark, N.J., [1993-94 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 89,644 (Jan. 10, 1994) (UCC
Corp. Decision No. 94-04). 12 U.S.C. § 30(b) authorized national banks to relocate their main office
to any authorized bank location within up to 30 miles beyond the limits of the city, town, or village in
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barriers to interstate bank acquisitions and mergers.63 States may opt out of
interstate banking, but they may prevent interstate mergers only by adopting
new legislation before June 1, 1997. 64
The principal significance of the 1994 legislation is the extent to which it
represents a shift in regulatory autonomy away from the states. As a
substantive matter, preemption of state anti-acquisition rules did not radically
alter the face of banking in the United States; during the 1980s, state law
became much more permissive on the subject of geographical diversification
and most states already allowed at least some interstate acquisitions. Neverthe-
less, congressional deference to state autonomy had encouraged states to
experiment, and occasionally experimentation had led to overtly protectionist
policies. For example, the first states to authorize interstate acquisitions
adopted regional entry statutes that excluded banks from non-favored states.s
These laws, designed to protect local banks and encourage the development
of viable regional institutions, were tolerated despite their discriminatory
impact because they were consistent with longstanding congressional policy to
permit local autonomy over issues of geographical expansion.' The 1994
legislation, however, signalled a sea change in congressional attitude toward
state experimentation. With a few exceptions,67 state authority to place
conditions on entry by out-of-state banks was revoked, resulting in uniform
national rules for interstate bank acquisitions.68
which it is located; unlike 12 U.S.C. § 36(c), the statute made no reference to state branching laws.
Thus, according to the Comptroller, a national bank could move its headquarters across state lines yet
retain its existing branches in its former home state.
By August 1995, the Comptroller had approved 32 main office relocations by national banks to sites
where, because of state branching restrictions, the banks could not have opened a new branch. In seven
cases, state-chartered banks converted to national charters just to take advantage of section 30(b). See
Justin Fox, In a First, Texas Suing To Block Interstate Entry Under 30-Mile Rule, AM. BANKER, Aug.
30, 1995, at 2.
Future main office relocations may be affected by recent interstate banking legislation. After May
31, 1997, whenever national banks relocate their main offices across state lines, offices left behind in
their former home state will be considered new branches for the purposes of relevant state branching
laws. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-328, 108
Stat. 2338, Rev. Stat. 5155(e)(2). Moreover, a group of state banking commissioners has challenged
the Comptroller's reading of section 30(b). See Brett Chase, State Regulators Taking Aim at the 30-Mile
Rule, AM. BANKER, Feb. 2, 1996, at 4.
63. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, supra note 62 (P. L. 103-
328, 108 Stat. 2338).
64. As of August 1995, only Texas had adopted opt-out legislation. See Fox, supra note 62, at 2.
65. E.g., Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159 (1985) (reviewing New England
interstate banking compact).
66. Id. (upholding legality of New England interstate compact under federal banking statutes and
the commerce, equal protection and interstate compact clauses of the U.S. Constitution).
67. See infra note 68.
68. Riegle-Neal preserves state "age" laws blocking acquisitions of newly formed banks, see, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.295(3)(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1906.3 (West
1993), but federal regulators may ignore these laws when the target bank is more than five years old.
Rev. Stat. § 5154(a). State laws relating to community investment, consumer protection, fair lending
and the establishment of in-state branches still generally apply to national bank branches, but the
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States retain some autonomy to opt out of interstate banking. They still may
bar interstate mergers and must authorize interstate branching before the
Comptroller of the Currency may approve new national bank branches within
their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the practical effect of federal preemption is
to discourage opting out. States may no longer prevent out-of-state bank
holding companies from entering by buying the stock or assets of in-state
banks. If states want to allow mergers between their banks and banks in
contiguous states, they must permit all mergers. Moreover, if states permit
interstate mergers, restrictive branching rules cannot prevent entry by out-of-
state banks. Thus, although Congress stopped short of wholesale preemption
of state law, the national policy of encouraging interstate banking is likely to
prevail over more restrictive state policies.69
C. Deposit Insurance
Federal insurance of bank deposits is often blamed for much federal
regulation, or overregulation, of banks. Government exposure to losses in the
event of bank failure provides a justification for regulation aimed at preserving
bank safety and soundness, occasionally at the expense of beneficial risk-taking
and experimentation. These rules would be unnecessary were the deposit
insurance guarantee to be limited or eliminated, allowing private risk-bearers
to police their banks. Bank chartering authorities would then be free to
participate in the race to a more deregulatory equilibrium.
To the extent that there is political will to shrink the deposit insurance
system (and the responsibility that it imposes on federal regulators to supervise
the banking industry), the impetus is coming from the national government, not
from the states. In 1995, Representative Jim Leach introduced federal financial
reform legislation that would allow national and Federal Reserve member
banks to opt out of the federal deposit insurance scheme.7' The legislation
Comptroller of the Currency may ignore these laws too if they to discriminate against the national bank.
Rev. Stat. § 5155(f)(1)(A).
One area where states retain limited discretion to resist the federal trend toward interstate banking
is their power to set deposit caps limiting the percentage of total in-state deposits that may be controlled
by any single banking institution. Although not a complete barrier to interstate banking, deposit caps
may discourage entry by some out-of-state banks as well as limit in-state mergers. As of late 1995, 21
states had deposit caps ranging from 40 percent to as low as 10 percent. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 524.1802 (10 percent cap); see also Brett Chase, Bigger Players Battle States Over Caps on Deposits,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 19, 1995, at 4.
69. At least some states continue to do battle at the margin to resist federal policy. One example
is the deposit cap legislation described in supra note 68. Another is legislation currently under
consideration in Kansas that would give the state banking commissioner discretion to block mergers that
result in downsizing involving the loss of a significant number of in-state jobs. Bill McConnell, Kansas
Bill Would Enable State to Bar Mergers Involving Layoffs, AM. BANKER, Feb. 1, 1996, at 2. Like
deposit caps, this legislation technically would not discriminate against out-of-state entrants;
nevertheless, this may be its practical effect.
70. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, H.R. 1062, § 117. As described in Subsection
I.A.2 supra, this legislation did not reach the House floor in 1995.
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would create a new class of wholesale financial institutions that would accept
only large uninsured deposits but that could retain other privileges currently
afforded banks (such as access to the Federal Reserve's discount window).
Wholesale financial institutions would be subject to less regulatory oversight
and would have correspondingly greater powers than federally insured banks.
The creation of uninsured wholesale financial institutions would represent
a significant change from current federal law that requires national banks and
state-chartered banks that become Federal Reserve members to participate in
the deposit insurance scheme.7 In contrast, under federal law, participation
by state-chartered nonmember banks is voluntary. Nevertheless, since the wave
of bank failures during the 1980s, most states have chosen to encourage all
state-chartered banks to maintain federal deposit insurance.' As a result,
federal preemption of state law would be required to give state-chartered banks
the power to opt out of federal deposit insurance and enjoy the privileges
afforded to wholesale financial institutions.
A state's decision to require its banks to obtain federal deposit insurance
has an obvious economic motive: states thereby shift the cost of bank failure
resolution to the federal government. Yet by granting a federal agency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, regulatory authority over their banks,
states also relinquish some of their discretion to compete for bank charters by
adopting banker-friendly rules.7' Again, states appear willing to accept more
regulation of their banks than the competitive story of bank chartering would
suggest.
71. Federal Deposit Insurance Act see. 4(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1994).
72. Federal deposit insurance is mandatory in at least fifteen states. E.g., ALA. CODE § 5-5A-12
(1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-204 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-70 (West 1995); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 658.38 (Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:3-201(8) (1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
205, para. 5/13(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:216 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-B-422 (West 1980 & Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INSr. § 5-509 (1992);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-702 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661.015 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-9.1 (1994); OHIO REV. STAT. § 1101.061 (Anderson 1988); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 7-3-3(3) (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-103 (1993). Alaska allows its state banking commissioner
to mandate federal deposit insurance, ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.355 (1995). New Jersey mandates federal
deposit insurance but permits its commissioner to grant exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-15 (West
1984). Several states give their banks the alternative of purchasing private insurance or self-insuring,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-244 (1989) (FDIC or private insurance); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1301 (1991)
(FDIC or fidelity bond); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-3-105(7) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) (FDIC or
double liability for shareholders). Nevertheless, the potential loss of deposits to insured national banks
operating in these states may make federal deposit insurance a less costly option for many banks.
73. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act generally prevents insured state chartered
banks from engaging as principal in any activity not permissible for national banks. Federal Deposit
Insurance Act § 24, 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994). Assume that State X, facing the loss of bank charters
to the national sovereign, decides to allow its banks to act as insurance underwriters, an activity
currently not permissible for national banks. If State X requires its banks to be federally insured, its
banks may not exercise their new underwriting power unless national banks are first given the same
power. Thus, State X cannot compete for charters by promising its banks broader powers than the
national sovereign.
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D. Consumer Regulation
Although the states traditionally regulate consumer credit transactions
involving local borrowers,74 federal preemption occasionally is necessary to
protect the profitability of nationwide bank credit operations from restrictive
state laws. One example is the federal exportation principle that permits banks
with nationwide credit operations to ignore variations in state usury ceilings.
National banking laws permit a national bank to charge borrowers the highest
rate of interest allowed by the laws of its home state.75 In 1978, the Supreme
Court ruled that national banks could apply their home state's usury limits to
credit transactions conducted in any state regardless of local law.76 Two years
later, Congress extended the right to export interest rates to state-chartered
banks with national credit operations.'
The exportation principle encouraged the growth of interstate credit
operations by permitting banks to charge a single rate of interest to all credit
cardholders or mortgage customers. It also stimulated some competition for
bank charters, as a few states, notably Delaware and South Dakota, lowered
their usury ceilings to attract or retain bank credit operations.7" Nevertheless,
regulatory competition did not produce a deregulatory equilibrium. While
Delaware and South Dakota eliminated usury ceilings and invited out-of-state
banks to relocate their credit card operations, other states, including Pennsylva-
nia7l and California,'e adopted more restrictive regulation of consumer credit
terms, prohibiting credit card late payment fees. Predictably, the Comptroller
of the Currency took the position that these credit-related charges are "interest"
and therefore governed by the exportation principle.8 '
The practical result of the exportation principle is that so long as any single
state weakens or eliminates restrictions on credit terms or charges, lenders
operating out of that state can ignore the more restrictive credit laws of every
other state. Although, in theory, the federal solution defers to state usury laws,
74. For an analysis and critique of the conflict of laws rules that permit this result, see Peter V.
Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587 (1995).
75. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994).
76. Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1994).
78. See Burgess & Ciolfi, supra note 7, at 936.
79. See Mazaika v. Bank One, Columbus, 653 A.2d 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
80. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3500 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1996) (No. 95-850).
81. See 61 Fed. Reg. 4849, 4858 (Feb. 9, 1996) (adding 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 providing that late
fees are interest for the purposes of the federal exportation principle). Most courts agreed. See, e.g.,
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), 900 P.2d 690 (Cal. 1995); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts,
971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992). But see Mazaika v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 653 A.2d 640; Sherman
v. Citibank (South Dakota), 1995 N.J. Lexis 1354 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995); Hunter v. Greenwood Trust
Co., 1995 N.J. Lexis 1354 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995) (state prohibitions on late charges are not preempted
by federal law). The Supreme Court is expected to resolve this conflict in 1996.
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in practice, it selects as the uniform national rule the most favorable bargain
that banks can strike with any single state legislature. Again, federal
preemption is being used to trump more restrictive state regulation of financial
institutions.
III. DEVOLUTION AND REREGULATION: A PUBLIC CHOICE EXPLANATION
As Part II described, in significant areas of bank regulation, deference to
state experimentation has produced more restrictions on financial activities,
requiring federal preemption to achieve deregulation. This raises the question
why devolution is associated with enhanced regulation in the financial area. A
public choice analysis would suggest that state legislators are vulnerable to
rent-seeking by local interest groups that benefit from regulation.' These may
include insurance agents, small banks, local businesses, and consumer groups,
the classic "Main Street" coalition.
If correct, public choice analysis undercuts a compelling justification for
devolution-that the states are less susceptible to interest group capture, more
responsive to their citizenry, and more amenable to regulatory experimentation
than the national sovereign.' It also casts doubt on the competitive story,
which argues that states have financial incentives to attract bank charters by
adopting deregulatory policies. To the contrary, at least some states appear
willing to sacrifice chartering revenues in order to curry favor with in-state
firms that prefer to maintain regulatory subsidies.
A. Fees, Not Powers, Drive Charter Competition
Why would some states risk losing chartering revenues to the national
sovereign by adopting more restrictive, less banker-friendly regulatory policies?
One possible explanation is that states are not sacrificing chartering revenues
because restrictive state laws have not caused banks to defect to a national
charter. There is evidence to support this hypothesis. Between 1991 and mid-
1995, states experienced a net gain in bank charters at the expense of the
national chartering authority despite the Comptroller of the Currency's promise
to expand national bank powers.' The national chartering authority suffered
a particularly serious loss in 1995 when Chase and Chemical opted to retain
Chemical's New York state charter following their merger, costing the
82. See Sam Peltzmian, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976)
(explaining this economic theory of regulation).
83. C. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS Op AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (1993) (discussing
superiority of state over national lawmaking).
84. See Justin Fox, Stampede Toward State Charters Makes the OCC Change Its Tune, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 28, 1995, at 3.
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Comptroller's office more than $8 million in yearly fees.'
National chartering fees, and their impact on bank chartering decisions,
may explain why many states have managed to retain bank charters without
committing to deregulation. For the bank opting among chartering authorities,
fees may be a more significant consideration than powers. Bank chartering fees
must cover the cost of regulatory examinations as well as administrative
expenses associated with the chartering process. National chartering fees tend
to be higher than state chartering fees, reflecting the relatively higher salaries
paid to national bank examiners and the higher cost of national bank
examinations.8 6 For banks facing mounting pressure from their investors to
operate more efficiently, economizing on chartering fees is an easy way to
reduce fixed operating expenses.'
Although the national chartering authority has incentives to lower
chartering fees to discourage defections, its relatively higher administrative
costs limit its ability to compete with the states on the basis of fees."8 More-
over, as defections occur, lost chartering revenues force the national chartering
authority to downsize.8 9 This dilemma may explain recent moves by the
national sovereign to expand bank powers unilaterally. If the profits that
national banks can expect from greater investment opportunities are sufficient
to offset the premium that they must pay for the national charter, they may be
persuaded not to defect.
85. See Justin Fox, In Blow to OC, N.Y. Megabank Wi Go with a State Charter, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 31, 1995, at 1.
86. States share the cost of examining Federal Reserve member and insured nonmember banks with
the Federal Reserve and FDIC. As a result, their examination expenses are lower than those of the
Comptroller, whose office has sole examination responsibility for national banks. See Fox, supra note
84, at 3. In the past, the Federal Reserve and FDIC have not charged state-chartered banks for their
examinations. Recent proposals to change this policy have been assailed as an attack on the dual banking
system by those who fear that state-chartered banks, facing significantly higher fees, would have
financial incentives to convert to a national charter. See Justin Fox & Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Clinton
Revives Plan to Charge Fees for Exams of State Banks, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 1995, at 4.
87. A related factor may also beat play. Because of the close working relationship between a bank
and its primary regulatory authority, the reputation of the regulator matters. National bank examiners
have been reputed to be the toughest (and, according to some sources, the most unreasonable) of the
federal bank examiners. See Fox, supra note 84, at 3. Banks that prefer to deal with the Federal Reserve
or FDIC as their primary federal regulator have incentives to choose a state charter. The Comptroller's
recent effort to compete more effectively for bank charters has involved more than simply promising
greater powers to national banks; the Comptroller's office is also trying to improve the public image
of its examination staff. Id. at 3.
88. The Comptroller did lower fees somewhat in 1996. Nevertheless, fees remain significant,
including, for 1996, (1) new charter filing fees of $14,300; (2) assessments, based on consolidated
assets, ranging from $3158 for banks with assets of $2 million to over $2.1 million for banks with assets
of $40 million; (3) examination fees of $49 per hour; and (4) franchise fees of $1500 for banks acting
as municipal or government securities dealers. See Notice for 1996 Fees, OCC 95-66, Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 35-451 (Dec. 1, 1995).
89. This has been the consequence of recent charter losses. With fewer banks to supervise (and to
pay fees), the Comptroller's office has been forced to reduce its examination staff. Some examiners have
moved to the Federal Reserve, whose stable of banks has increased. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, OCC
Losing Seasoned Examiners As It 'Rightsizes' Its Work Force, AM. BANKER, Dec. 13, 1995, at 4.
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As a practical matter, however, many banks cannot exploit new powers
because of significant start-up costs. Moreover, individual preferences differ
as to the optimal diversification strategy. Some banks are more interested in
becoming investment bankers than in becoming insurance agents; others may
have no interest in either activity, preferring to become travel agents. To
persuade every potential defector to retain its national charter, the Comptroller
would have to diversify the menu of new national bank powers well beyond
existing statutory limits.' Finally, the recent profitability of the core banking
business may make new powers less of a priority for many banks.91 Thus, at
least at present, states are apparently winning the charter competition without
offering additional regulatory favors to banks.'
B. Local Banks Cannot Capture the Benefits of Deregulation
Variations in chartering fees cannot account for the absence of real
competition for bank charters among the states. In the past, intrastate charter
competition was assumed to be minimal because restrictions on interstate
banking required banks looking to move between state chartering authorities
to relocate their deposit-taking operations as well.' Nevertheless, this
impediment to interstate charter competition was created by the states
themselves. Each state had discretion to permit or restrict ownership of in-state
banks by out-of-state bank holding companies. 9 Therefore, any state could
choose to compete for charters by simultaneously expanding the powers of state
banks and inviting out-of-state banking organizations to enter by chartering a
new bank affiliate or by expanding an existing bank.
A few states did adopt this strategy. One of the first was South Dakota,
which in 1983 adopted "emergency" legislation permitting state-chartered
banks to engage in all facets of the insurance business.' At the time, most
90. National banking law limits banks to the business of banking and "all such incidental powers
as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking," 12 U.S.C. § 24 (para. seventh) (1994).
Although federal courts defer to the Comptroller of the Currency's interpretation of this language, see,
e.g., Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814-17
(1995) (upholding Comptroller's ruling that sale of annuities isa permissible national bank power), there
may be limits to what activities the Comptroller may reasonably decide are incidental to banking. See,
e.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 438 (1st Cir. 1972) (rejecting Comptroller's ruling
that operating a travel agency is a permissible activity for national banks).
91. See, e.g., Justin Fox, Bank Profits Rose 17% in 3Q, Fueled by Refund on Premiums, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 14, 1995, at 2.
92. The national sovereign may be content to attract a few large banks that value opportunities to
diversify. Nevertheless, the competitive story posits that the states will respond to changes in national
chartering law by broadening their own banks' powers, thereby leading to a competitive equilibrium.
As the next section will explain, however, the majority of states have no incentive to deregulate in order
to compete for a finite number of expansion-minded banks, especially when a larger pool of smaller
banks may prefer more restrictive state law. See infra Section III.B.
93. See supra note 7.
94. See supra Section II.B.
95. S.D. CODnqED LAWS § 51A-4-4 (1990).
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chartering authorities barred banks from virtually all insurance activities. 96
The goal of the South Dakota legislation was to persuade out-of-state bank
holding companies to charter new banks in South Dakota (or to contribute
resources to an existing South Dakota bank) just to take advantage of this
special opportunity to diversify. One such organization, Citicorp, committed
to invest $2.5 million in a facility in Rapid City and to employ at least 100 to
150 South Dakota residents.'
South Dakota's legislation is a good example of successful rent-seeking by
expansion-minded banks at the expense of local interests. The law was
expressly designed to benefit out-of-state bank holding companies that would
pay for expanded powers by bringing jobs and tax revenues to South Dakota.
Although the statute originally prohibited out-of-state entrants from competing
for South Dakota customers to the detriment of local financial institutions, it
was still vigorously opposed by South Dakota banks and insurance interests. 9
That the statute was passed despite powerful local opposition suggests that out-
of-state banking organizations like Citicorp were willing to pay more for
deregulation than in-state institutions could pay to defeat it.
Nevertheless, contrary to the competitive story, South Dakota's initiative
did not commence a regulatory competition in which other states vied to attract
or retain bank charters by liberalizing their own laws. Over the next twelve
years, a few states gave their banks expanded insurance powers,' but as
many or more states resisted the competition, retaining or strengthening local
barriers between banking and insurance."tu This raises the question why
expansion-minded banks succeeded in bargaining for deregulation in some
states but failed in others.
One possible reason is that, having obtained favorable legislation in one
state, expansion-minded banks did not need to bargain with other state
legislatures. If establishing an insurance bank in South Dakota allowed a bank
holding company to market insurance nationwide, once every expansion-
minded bank holding company had chartered a bank in South Dakota, the
competition would be over. Subsequent commitments by other states to follow
96. See Note, Paving the Way in the Financial Services Industry: South Dakota Opens the Insurance
Industry to Banks, 29 S.D. L. REV. 172, 179 (1983).
97. See Citicorp, Order Denying the Acquisition of a Bank, 71 FED. REs. BULL. 789 (1985)
[hereinafter Citicorp].
98. See Independent Community Bankers Ass'n of South Dakota v. South Dakota, 346 N.W.2d 737
(S.D. 1984). Challengers included the Independent Community Bankers Association, representing local
banks, and three local insurance trade groups, the Professional Insurance Agents of South Dakota, the
South Dakota Association of Life Underwriters, and the Independent Insurance Agents of South Dakota.
South Dakota's effort to protect in-state institutions from competition ultimately proved
counterproductive. The Federal Reserve Board refused to permit Citicorp to acquire a South Dakota
insurance bank on the ground that a South Dakota bank that would engage in no financial business in
South Dakota was a sham. Citicorp, supra note 97.
99. These included California in 1988 and Delaware in 1990. See supra note 37.
100. See supra note 38.
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South Dakota's lead would not persuade these banking organizations to
defect.101
Nevertheless, state autonomy over regulation of financial institutions means
that a single state like South Dakota cannot win the competition so easily. To
the extent that states have asserted the power to determine who may sell
insurance within their borders, they may close important markets to out-of-state
banks.1" The same problem affects banks seeking more favorable interstate
branching or consumer credit regimes. Except in those cases where federal
preemption allows banks to ignore local regulatory barriers,"to each state
retains control of the conduct of a financial business within its borders. For
banks seeking to do an interstate business, negotiating favorable changes in the
laws of their chartering authority may not be sufficient."
Thus, past decisions by the national sovereign to delegate regulatory
authority to the states mean that expansion-minded banks contemplating a
nationwide business may be forced to bargain with fifty state legislatures.
These banks could decide to avoid states with unfavorable laws, but some of
the most restrictive states, such as Florida, control access to some of the most
desirable customer markets. Rather than investing resources to achieve more
banker-friendly state law, however, expansion-minded banks have usually
responded by mounting legal challenges to local regulation."05 Again, this
raises the question why bargaining for deregulation at the state level has been
so difficult.
The answer may be that the banks willing to invest in deregulation are too
geographically dispersed and poorly organized to bargain for favorable results
101. Other states might persuade bank holding companies to defect by offering a better deal than
South Dakota's, for example, by promising insurance powers plus financial incentives to relocate. At
some point, however, the value of the deal for the state would decline so far that the state would have
little incentive to compete at all. Moreover, South Dakota might still be able to retain bank charters
despite moves by other states to copy its lead if South Dakota's commitment to maintain a banker-
friendly legal regime were more credible than that of other states-for example, because South Dakota
is more dependent on tax revenues from the banking industry than other states with more diversified
economies. Cf Bratton & McCahery, supra note 10, at 1879-80 (describing Delaware's commitment
to maintain its favorable corporate legal regime as contributing to its success in corporate charter
competition).
102. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
103. See supra text accompanying note 76 (describing federal exportation principle that allows
banks to ignore variations in local usury ceilings).
104. Cy. Letsou, supra note 74, at 658-70 (noting this problem with respect to current conflict of
laws rules relating to consumer credit regulation and arguing that change in these rules to apply the law
of lender's place of business rather than the law of borrower's place of residence to consumer credit
transactions would improve regulatory competition).
105. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 43 and 81, supra. Mounting piecemeal legal challenges to state
law is costly, but apparently less costly than legislative bargaining. The explanation may be that the legal
issues involved in individual cases are similar enough that individual banks economize on legal costs
by sharing research and expertise. Moreover, in challenging state law, banks often enjoy the support
of the national sovereign. Finally, expansion-minded banks usually prevail in legal challenges to state
restrictions, particularly in the federal appellate courts. In contrast, their track record in bargaining for
favorable legislative outcomes is much more disappointing.
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in every state, particularly when their efforts are opposed by more cohesive
organized local financial interests. These local interests that oppose deregula-
tion often include local banks as well as rival financial firms; for example, in
South Dakota, local banks joined with the local insurance industry to fight
changes in state law that permitted bank insurance sales."° Local bankers'
support for limitations on their own powers seems counterintuitive, particularly
since many observers believe that local banks could compete quite successfully
with independent insurance agents.107
Nevertheless, local banks cannot retain the gains from deregulation at the
state level. If their state's law becomes more banker-friendly than the laws of
rival chartering authorities, new banks will enter, increasing competition. 08
The new entrants, usually subsidiaries of expansion-minded bank holding
companies, are likely to be better capitalized, better diversified, and more
aggressive risk-takers than local banks. Even if local banks favor greater
powers, the competitive threat posed by potential new entrants may persuade
them to join with insurance agents and other affected interests to defeat
deregulation.
Thus, public choice analysis offers an explanation of why, instead of
moving bank chartering authorities toward regulatory equilibrium, regulatory
competition among the states has produced many different local bargains.
Although there are banks that can be persuaded to commit resources to states
that adopt deregulatory policies, these expansion-minded banks represent only
one of many interest groups with a stake in local financial regulation. In
negotiating for deregulation, expansion-minded banks may face opposition from
a coalition that includes not only rival financial institutions (like insurance
agents) but also small local banks that have an interest in protecting their turf
from new entrants.
Moreover, when local interests organize, they are likely to be more
effective political actors at the state level than expansion-minded banks, which
as outsiders are unfamiliar with local political practices. Local bankers and
insurance agents act through local trade organizations that are repeat players
106. See supra note 98.
107. See, e.g., John Kimelman, A Natural Next Step forBank Marketers?, AM. BANKER, Nov. 10,
1995, at 3A (suggesting that banks could draw on preexisting customer relationships and distribution
systems to market insurance products and that major insurance underwriters are eager to sell insurance
through banks).
108. Theoretically, local banks could bargain for increased insurance powers for themselves but
higher barriers to entry by out-of-state banks. For example, Florida's proilbition on affiliations between
banks and insurance agents exempts unit banks (banks that are not part of holding company structures)
located in cities with populations of less than five thousand. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.988(1)(a)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1996). Nevertheless, without a credible commitment by out-of-state banks to
contribute new resources to the state, local banks may not have the clout to bargain for favorable
legislative changes for themselves, particularly when they face opposition from equally powerful local
insurance interests.
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in the state legislative bargaining process.1°9 In contrast, out-of-state bankers
often have no preexisting relationships with individual state legislators.
Although these banks make may an initial commitment of resources in return
for favorable changes in the state's legal regime, local legislators may distrust
their willingness to maintain and expand their local investments over the long
term."10 In contrast, local financial interests have reason to build reputational
capital by honoring their commitments to legislators.
Local interests are also likely to be effective actors at the state level
because they often have a larger stake in the outcome than expansion-minded
banks. If State X repeals its interstate banking restrictions, each of its local
banks may risk a substantial loss in the value of its franchise. In contrast, the
expected gain to each out-of-state bank that plans to enter State X may be small
(for example, State X's deposit pool may be limited and must be shared with
multiple new entrants). Therefore, State X's local banks have reason to devote
greater resources to defeating reform than expansion-minded banks will
contribute to achieving reform.
This suggests that where local banks have enough political clout to bargain
for legislative outcomes, but not enough economic clout to risk competitive
challenges from new entrants, they will invest substantial resources to oppose
deregulation. Conversely, where the local financial industry is weak and not
effectively organized, expansion-minded banks can more easily overcome
opposition to deregulation."' This may explain why Delaware has recently
taken the lead in bank deregulation at the state level.112 Delaware was not a
major financial center when its legislature decided to allow bank entry into
insurance, so expansion-minded banks faced relatively weak opposition when
they bargained for deregulation. Today, thanks to the commitment of resources
by out-of-state bank entrants, the banking industry has become Delaware's
109. See, e.g., supra note 98 (citing local South Dakota trade organizations that opposed insurance
legislation).
110. The terms of South Dakota's bargain with out-of-state bank holding companies, see supra note
98, suggests an attempt to address this concern. Although South Dakota could insist that out-of-state
bank holding companies commit a level of resources to the state as a condition to entry, the legislature
could not count on these companies to conduct their business in ways that would benefit South Dakota.
For example, the new entrants could drain deposits from the state rather than reinvesting them in loans
to South Dakota customers, or they could employ pricing practices that would drive local financial firms
out of business. Moreover, since the new entrants had ties with multiple states, they could simply
relocate should South Dakota attempt to punish these behaviors. South Dakota's solution was to welcome
out-of-state entrants but bar them from competing for South Dakota banking or insurance customers,
thereby externalizing these potential costs.
111. In some states, the local financial industry may be dominated by large expansion-minded
institutions that are not afraid of competitive challenge. For example, the banking industries in
California and New York might be expected to bargain successfully for local deregulatory policies. In
fact, California was one of the first states to allow bank entry into the insurance business. See supra note
37.
112. South Dakota may have been targeted by expansion-minded banks in the 1980s for the same
reason, although local interests in South Dakota were powerful enough to bargain for some protection
from competition from the new entrants. See supra note 110.
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second-largest employer." 3
C. Congressional Silence Reflects the Failure of Competing Interests to
Achieve Their Goals At the National Level
The cost of bargaining for deregulation at the state level suggests that
expansion-minded banks should concentrate their resources on obtaining
deregulation at the national level through federal preemption. In bargaining for
federal deregulation, expansion-minded banks begin with several advantages.
As a group, they should be able to outspend factionalized local interests that
have exhausted their resources in bargaining for restrictive state legislation.
Moreover, because a national solution will displace more restrictive state laws,
expansion-minded banks will not have to invest in bargaining at the state level.
This analysis suggests that financial deregulation is more likely to occur at
the national than at the state level. Nevertheless, to conclude that deregulation
is easier to achieve at the national level does not mean that deregulation is
inevitable. Federal preemption of interstate banking restrictions in 1994 was a
victory for expansion-minded banks, but they were less successful in 1995,
when they failed to obtain either greater securities powers or preemption of
state insurance restrictions." 4 In fact, the politics of financial reform in 1995
suggest that the local interests that successfully bargain for restrictive
regulation at the state level have considerable clout in Congress as well.
It may be that these local interests do not have to commit the same level of
resources as expansion-minded banks in order to achieve their goals at the
national level. So long as Congress fails to preempt state regulation, local
interests can preserve the benefits of their bargains. Moreover, Congress has
strong incentives to remain silent. Given variations in the strength and
preferences of local financial interests, national politicians may maximize their
own political support by deferring to customized local bargains.' As a
result, Delaware is free to continue to please its expansion-minded banking
industry by granting new powers, while Florida is free to help its local
financial institutions protect their turf.
Nevertheless, because national and state sovereigns compete for regulatory
autonomy over financial institutions, congressional neutrality does not always
protect local bargains. Even where Congress has ceded regulatory authority to
113. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Delaware's Champion of Banks Stating Case Nationally, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 8, 1995, at 3.
114. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
115. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265, 274-76, 281-84
(1990). Professor Macey cites federal deference to state bank branching restrictions as an instance where
political support maximization by national policy makers dictates deference to local solutions. Id. at 283.
Nevertheless, in 1994, Congress chose to preempt at least some of these customized local solutions. See
supra Section lI.B.
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the states, the national sovereign has incentives to expand its authority at the
expense of state control. The Comptroller of the Currency's efforts to grant
national banks new insurance powers is an example. Although McCarran-
Ferguson permits states to regulate the business of insurance, the Comptroller's
decision that annuities are a banking rather than an insurance product"
6
limited the reach of restrictive state laws, frustrating the ability of local
interests to enforce their legislative bargains.
To preserve their bargains, therefore, local interests are forced periodically
to devote resources at the national level to persuade Congress to confirm state
autonomy over financial regulation. In the past, local interests have been highly
successful. In 1982, for example, Congress stopped the Federal Reserve from
granting insurance powers to bank holding companies, thereby protecting state
laws that barred affiliations between banks and insurance companies."'
In 1995, local interests again bargained at the national level to preserve
state restrictions on bank insurance activities. House leaders eventually agreed
to attach a moratorium on the expansion of national bank insurance powers to
pending Glass-Steagall reform legislation."' Inclusion of the moratorium
caused some expansion-minded banks to withdraw support for the legislation,
delaying passage of the bill. 19
This legislative deadlock may be evidence that expansion-minded banks are
becoming more adept at bargaining at the national level. In the past, local
interests were more effective coalition-builders, uniting small banks and
insurance agents in support of state autonomy."2 In contrast, expansion-
minded banks quarrelled over priorities and were unable to form cross-industry
alliances. 121
The decision of major Wall Street securities firms to join with money
center banks to support Glass-Steagall reform in 1995 signalled a significant
shift in interest group power, creating a group that, although not powerful
enough to achieve deregulation, may be able to defeat legislation that will halt
further deregulatory initiatives on the part of the national sovereign." Thus,
116. See supra text accompanying note 33.
117. See supra note 19.
118. See supra Subsection ll.A.2.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
120. Insurance agents in particular have been a powerful interest group with great influence in
Congress. In the early 1980s, the Independent Insurance Agents of America, the industry's national
lobbying organization, represented 35,000 insurance agencies doing business in all fifty states. (In
contrast, the American Bankers Association had 13,200 members.) See Daniel Hertzberg & Christopher
Conte, Bill Puts Crimp in Banks' Insurance Role As Insurers Wield Their Capitol Hill Clout, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 6, 1982, at 16.
121. While insurance agents had one issue-keeping banks out oftheir business-expansion-minded
banks had multiple priorities; for some, securities powers were more significant than insurance. Id.
122. Collective action problems remain for expansion-minded banks. In 1995, when congressional
leaders successfully demanded a moratorium on new national bank insurance powers as the price for
supporting Glass-Steagall reform, the banking industry was divided. The Comptroller of the Currency
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in 1996, congressional silence may reflect a standoff between two interest
groups, each sufficiently powerful to block the other's effort to achieve its
goals through federal legislation. Nevertheless, this equilibrium is inherently
unstable; it is likely to break down as competing interest groups continue to vie
for political influence."
IV. DEVOLUTION AND DEREGULATION: THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT
There may be another reason why national policy on issues of financial
regulation has proved so unstable during the mid-1990s. Public choice analysis
tends to ignore the role of ideology in influencing political outcomes. Adding
ideology to the political equation is not necessarily inconsistent with rent-
seeking explanations of legislative outcomes. Rather, it offers a different
perspective on the rent-seeking process. Specifically, as applied to financial
regulation, it may explain why legislative bargains at the national level are so
difficult to reach and tend to be breached so rapidly.
Ideological preferences may affect interest group bargaining in several
ways. The inability of affected constituencies to police lawmakers to enforce
their bargains, called regulatory "slack" by some economists, 124 may free
policy makers to pursue personal ideological goals. In this case, legislative
results may be at odds with the expected outcomes of interest group bargaining.
Alternatively, policy makers may appeal to ideology to shape public opinion
lobbied banks to oppose the entire reform package if the moratorium remained. See Jaret Seiberg,
Comptroller to Bankers: Insurance Sales Crucial, AM. BANKER, Oct. 10, 1995, at 1. In response, 36
bank chief executives signed a letter to House members criticizing the amended bill, but some key
industry supporters of Glass-Steagall reform, such as J.P. Morgan, did not join with them. Bill
McConnell, 36 CEOs Urge Gingrich to Kill Insurance Curbs, AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1995, at 1. For
banks like Morgan, Glass-Steagall reform apparently was more important than preserving the
Comptroller's autonomy to expand national bank insurance powers. For other expansion-minded banks,
insurance powers apparently were more significant than underwriting powers.
Bank trade organizations also disagreed. In October 1995, the Independent Bankers Association of
America, a trade group for small banks, dropped its long-standing opposition to Glass-Steagall reform
and endorsed the reform package, including the moratorium on new national bank insurance powers.
In contrast, the American Bankers Association, long a supporter of Glass-Steagall reform, refused to
endorse the legislation. See Bill McConnell, IBAA Backs Leach Package, Saying Insurance Provision
Isn't So Bad, AM. BANKER, Oct. 11, 1995, at 2.
123. In 1996, in the Senate, expansion-minded banks had a powerful ally in Banking Committee
Chairman Alfonse D'Amato, who favored federal legislation removing all barriers between banking and
other commercial businesses. See, e.g., Justin Fox, D'Amato Aide Urges Jump-Start For Reforming
Glass-Steagall, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1995, at 4. Moreover, the banking industry hoped that a
favorable ruling from the Supreme Court in the Barnett case would, at least temporarily, resolve the
issue of bank insurance powers, paving the way for Glass-Steagall reform. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court decision was expected to increase pressure on Congress to adopt legislation reaffirming
state control of bank insurance activities. Mindful of this conflict, Congressman Leach tried to regain
support for his reform statute by brokering a compromise between the banking and insurance industries.
Bill McConnell, Banks, Divided Over Insurance, Fail to Rally Around Glass-Steagall Bill, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 4, 1996, at 3.
124. E.g., Joseph Kalt& Mark Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing
For Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990).
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and to provide their political bargains with the cloak of intellectual legitimacy.
In this case, interest group bargaining accounts for legislative outcomes;
ideology helps to mask the bargaining process from public view and criticism.
In financial regulation, ideology plays both roles. First, it fills in gaps in
the public choice story. The clash of interest groups described in Part III is
nothing new; the debate over financial regulation has always pitted large,
expansion-minded financial institutions against small, local institutions. Interest
group preferences are predictable, but individual legislators' willingness to
reward one powerful interest group at the expense of another equally powerful
interest group is less predictable. The personal ideological preferences of
imperfectly monitored policy makers may provide an explanation.
Second, the inability of policy makers to articulate a clear ideological
justification for legislative results may make the average legislator reluctant to
commit to interest group bargains. Recently, legislative bargaining over
financial regulation has been derailed by ideological dissonance, a factor that
is working in favor of local pro-regulatory interests. Ironically, the problem
results from the clash of two ideological preferences that are widely shared by
policy makers and their constituents. Today's politicians on both sides of the
aisle profess their commitment to the twin goals of shrinking the federal
government and dismantling overly restrictive regulation that prevents free
competition and economic growth. In financial regulation, however, these two
ideals are inconsistent, creating a dilemma for legislators and for theorists who
seek to understand and legitimize the legislative process.
A. The Political Dilemma: Is Devolution Inconsistent With Deregulation?
Traditionally, critics of financial regulation have focused almost exclusively
on overregulation at the federal level. Many accepted without question the
competitive story of bank chartering and assumed that state freedom to
experiment with regulation would produce a desirable deregulatory equilibrium.
In fact, however, a diminished federal role will mean that states are free to
adopt and retain financial regulation that is protectionist and anticompetitive.
Preemption of state regulation demands an enhanced federal role that is
inconsistent with the ideological bent of today's politician.
This creates a dilemma for the legislator who is publicly committed to both
deregulation and devolution. For example, in 1995, Republican House leaders
who earlier in the year had made expansion of bank securities powers a priority
eventually derailed their own reform legislation by including provisions that
protected state laws barring bank entry into the insurance business.1" Some
of these legislators may have been swayed by campaign contributions from
affected industry groups. Insurance agents in particular have traditionally been
125. See supra Subsection I.A.2.
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effective political actors at the congressional level." Nevertheless, even
Banking Committee Chairman Leach, who was close to the banking community
and who had a personal reputational interest in Glass-Steagall reform, allowed
his legislation to become a referendum on federalism.127
Representative Leach maintained publicly that he would have preferred
legislation that was silent on the issue of bank insurance powers."n Neverthe-
less, opponents argued that congressional silence was not neutrality so long as
the Comptroller of the Currency was free to interpret national banking laws to
enhance the regulatory authority of the national sovereign at the expense of the
states. 29 As debate over financial reform shifted from deregulation to
devolution, congressional leadership could not afford to ignore this argu-
ment.
130
Similarly, this argument could not be ignored by the average legislator who
would eventually have to justify a vote for bank deregulation to her constitu-
ents. When the issue was simply Glass-Steagall reform, the legislation affected
a relatively small group of large financial institutions that operated in the
securities markets and was of little interest to the general public. Once
federalism became the issue, however, the political stakes were higher. A vote
for Glass-Steagall reform without the limitations on the national sovereign
demanded by supporters of state autonomy could be portrayed by political
opponents as a vote for big banks and big government. To be identified with
both Wall Street and Washington would not enhance the reputations of most
legislators in the mid-1990s.
126. See supra note 120. For example, House Speaker Newt Gingrich reportedly told bankers that
the moratorium was added to the securities reform bill for a simple reason: insurance agents can turn
out more votes on the issue than bankers can. See Keith Bradsher, No New Deal for Banking; Efforts
to Drop Depression-Era Barriers Stall, Again, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at D1.
Nevertheless, the political influence of independent insurance agents may be waning. First, due to
competition from direct writers, independent agents' market share is shrinking. See, e.g., Victoria
Sonshine Pasher, Shrinking Mkt Squeezes Personal Lines Agencies, NAT'L UNDERWRITE PROPERTY &
CASUALTY/RIsK & BENEFITs MANAGEMENT ED., Aug. 14, 1995, at 3. Second, in their fight against
bank entry, independent agents do not have the support of the insurance underwriters, most of whom
would welcome banks as distributors of their products.
127. For the reaction of the banking industry, which had counted on Leach's leadership to achieve
Glass-Steagall reform in 1995, see Bill McConnell, Second Thoughts About Leach's Guidance, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 14, 1995, at 4.
128. Barbara A. Rehm & Bill McConnell, Leach Wants A Bank Bill Without Ban On Insurance,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 27, 1995, at 1.
129. One of the chief advocates of this position was House Rules Committee Chairman Gerald
Solomon, who was skillful in casting the issue as one of federalism. In his words, federal banking
officials had "abused their power" by expanding national bank insurance powers in defiance of state law.
Olaf de Senerpont Domis, House Rules Chief Warns That Floor Procedure Could Kill Ban on Wider
Powers, AM. BANKER, Aug. 1, 1995, at 2. Depicted this way, the problem of bank insurance powers
was more significant, and more urgent, than a skirmish between two interest groups seeking to expand
their market shares.
130. See Robert M. Garsson, Capitol Account: Leach Eyes End Run For Bank Legislation, AM.
BANKER, July 28, 1995, at 3 (noting that top House Republicans were beginning to side with the
insurance industry's position).
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Thus, the average legislator had reason to embrace an amendment that
appeared to halt the expansion of national regulatory authority at the expense
of state autonomy. Characterized as such, the amendment was consistent with
the ideological preferences of the majority of policy makers, whether those
preferences were honestly held or borrowed to appeal to constituents.
Ironically, however, by supporting state autonomy, these congressional
proponents of devolution were in the curious position of defending state-
imposed entry barriers that retarded free competition for financial services-the
very kinds of overregulation that they had pledged to abolish at the national
level.
B. The Theoretical Dilemma: Does Restrictive State Law Reflect
Majoritarian Values?
The conflict between the goals of financial deregulation and devolution also
creates a dilemma for theorists seeking to understand the legislative process and
to predict regulatory outcomes. For decades, most have assumed that economic
deregulation was in the public interest. 131 In the case of financial institutions,
deregulation promises greater convenience for consumers, lower transaction
costs, and improved competitiveness in global markets where U.S. financial
institutions once flourished but are in danger of losing their advantage. 131
If financial deregulation is in the public interest, the question arises whether
this public-regarding policy is more likely to inform legislative outcomes at the
state or at the national level. Traditional regulatory competition theory assumed
that states were willing to experiment with deregulation to the same extent as,
or even to a greater extent than, the national government. Traditional public
choice analysis supported the competitive story. Interest group bargaining,
which persuades states to adopt banker-friendly laws in order to attract
charters, should result in deregulation that ultimately benefits the public.
Experience with devolution in the financial area suggests that state
autonomy does not necessarily lead to less regulation. This result can be
131. Since at least the 1980s, there has been broad academic consensus that economic regulation
of fundamentally competitive markets (such as airlines) does not serve the public interest. See, e.g.,
MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 238 (1985); Michael E.
Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward
a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 186-87 (Special Issue 1990); Michael E. Levine, Revisionism
Revised?AirlineDeregulation and the PubicInterest, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 179 (No. 1, 1981).
132. For a statement of these public benefits of bank deregulation, see Modernizing the Financial
System: U.S. Treasury Department Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, supra note
24, at 54-57. Of course, there are risks associated with bank deregulation that may be more serious than
those associated with deregulation of other businesses; for example, increased rates of bank failure
potentially impose costs on parties other than the failed bank and its stakeholders. See Helen A. Garten,
What Price Bank Failure?, 50 OntO ST. L.. 1159, 1162-76 (1989) (describing various costs of bank
failure). Nevertheless, assuming adequate safeguards are in place, expanding opportunities for banks to
diversify may strengthen their capital and competitive positions, making failure less likely. See, e.g.,
Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 24, at 56-57.
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reconciled with both regulatory competition and public choice theories if some
assumptions are changed to reflect the realities of the banking industry.
Because regulatory competition in banking means that states vie for resources
by opening previously closed local financial markets to new entrants, local
financial interests, fearing increased competition, have reason to outspend
expansion-minded banks in order to preserve local entry barriers.
The question arises whether this result is also consistent with majoritarian
values. Several factors suggest that to dismiss restrictive state financial
legislation as purely the product of rent-seeking by narrow industry groups may
be too simple and that restrictive state law may reflect majoritarian values.
Restrictive state regulation may not make the majority of people better off by
maximizing the efficient allocation of resources (the opposite may be true).'
Nevertheless, regulation may satisfy deeply held ideological preferences that
are shared by a wide segment of the public.
In this respect, supporters of local financial regulation have been more
successful than expansion-minded interests in appealing to ideology to justify
their positions to the public.'34 Proponents of financial deregulation have had
trouble convincing the public that freeing banks from regulation is in the public
interest. Although they have cited the public benefits of enhanced competition,
their arguments have been less compelling than similar arguments made in
favor of deregulation of nonbanking businesses, such as airlines or truck-
ing. 35 In the case of financial regulation, pro-regulatory interests have been
able to undercut these arguments by appealing to deeply held public preferen-
ces for local autonomy, local experimentation, and the protection of local
enterprise, concerns that have more relevance to banking than to airlines or
trucking. For example, laws that protect the friendly local bank from
acquisition by a large national chain appeal to a public that is convinced that
bigger banks charge higher fees than local banks.' 36
In some cases, popular ideological beliefs result in consumer preferences
that may be somewhat inconsistent. For example, a 1991 consumer survey
conducted by the Gallup Organization and the American Banker found that
two-thirds of the respondents agreed with the proposition "I prefer to do my
banking at a smaller, local bank rather than at a larger bank."' 37 Yet the
survey also found that a majority of consumers were open to buying nonbank-
133. See infra notes 137-138.
134. Professor Letsou makes this argument with respect to state restrictions on coercive collection
practices of consumer lenders. See Letsou, supra note 74, at 652-54.
135. Cf. DERThMCK & QUiRK, supra note 131, at 238-39 (noting that pro-competitive arguments
in favor of airline, trucking, and telecommunications deregulation had broad political appeal).
136. See, e.g., Matt Schulz, Customers Pay a PremiumforBandkng With Out-of-State Institutions,
Fed Finds, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7, 1995, at 3.
137. Robert M. Garsson, Uneasiness Mounts Over Health of System, in AM. BANKER 1991
CONSUMER SURVEY, Jan. 1991, at 12.
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ing financial products such as stock and bond mutual funds and annuities from
their banks.' Presumably, larger banks are more likely than smaller, local
banks to be able to offer the diversified package of financial products that
many customers want.
Attitudes toward bank insurance sales reveal similar inconsistencies. A
majority of bank customers said that they would buy annuities from their banks
but only 35 percent would buy life insurance.139 In 1995, banks represented
just 1 percent of total life insurance sales.Y° Nevertheless, in recent years,
traditional life insurance agents have neglected the low- and middle-income
market.' Although sales of life insurance through bank branches seems an
efficient way to reach this neglected market, bank entry has been frustrated
both by the wariness of bank customers and by restrictive state laws that bar
banks from marketing insurance products. 2
Public distrust of deregulation has enabled state legislators to promote some
restrictive state bank regulation, including prohibitions on bank insurance sales,
as pro-consumer. Legislators typically cite the danger of coercive tying
arrangements, whereby banks force consumers to buy insurance products as a
condition to receiving credit, as the justification for restricting bank insurance
sales. 43 Of course, this public-regarding justification may mask the legisla-
ture's real purpose of rewarding local banks and insurance agents. Neverthe-
less, politicians can successfully hide the legislative bargaining process from
public view and criticism only if their public positions are consistent with
popular values and beliefs. In this case, feeding public fear of the consequences
of deregulation reflects and actually confirms public perceptions of the dangers
of financial conglomeration.
Moreover, in passing restrictive regulation, legislators may be legitimately
responding to the demands of consumer groups. Consumer groups have
supported state prohibitions on late fees and other local consumer credit
regulation." Local community groups have cited consumer concerns in
138. Judy Ferring, Public Is Open to New Products, in AM. BANKER 1991 CONSUMER SURVEY,
Jan. 1991, at 18.
139. Id.
140. Kimelman, supra note 107, at 4A.
141. Id. at 3A.
142. See supra Subsection I.A.1.
143. See supra note 40 (discussing stated purpose of Florida legislation); see also First Advantage
Ins. v. Green, 652 So. 2d 562 (La. Ct. App., 1st Cir. 1995) (citing prevention of tying as purpose of
Louisiana antiaffiliation statute), cert. denied, 654 So. 2d 331 (La. 1995).
144. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 4858 (noting opposition by consumer groups, as well as class action
plaintiffs' attorneys, to the Comptroller's classification of late fees charged by national banks as
"interest" subject to the exportation principle). See also Letsou, supra note 74, at 629 n.139
(acknowledging consumer group support for legal restrictions on contract terms defining lender
remedies).
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efforts to block bank expansions and mergers.145 Thus, state legislators
considering restrictive financial regulation may be able to count on local
consumer groups to join the coalition in support of regulation.
Consumer support does not necessarily mean that state restrictions always
benefit the public. 11 Consumer groups may share public fears that large,
expansion-minded banks will be less responsive to local needs than small
financial institutions. They may also feel some community of interest with local
firms that are repeat players in the legislative bargaining process and may be
trusted to keep their bargains.
Finally, support for deregulation will make leaders of consumer groups the
political allies of large, powerful and often out-of-state banking institutions that
will benefit from changes in state law. If consumer leaders are unable to
convince their constituents that these institutions are truly committed to the
welfare of local residents, they may suffer a serious decline in their own
prestige and power. For this reason, consumer leaders will not take an active
public role in lobbying for financial deregulation.
Therefore, state legislatures are unlikely to face serious opposition from
consumer groups or the public when they enact restrictive bank regulation. In
many cases, they may enjoy substantial public support. At the least, local
politicians may be able to persuade their constituents that local experimentation
is always preferable to uniform standards imposed by the national sovereign.
V. CONCLUSION
When states act to impose tighter restrictions on their banks than those
favored by the national sovereign, their choices may be more responsive to
public preferences than the deregulatory policies recently endorsed by the
Comptroller of the Currency. Financial deregulation may reflect elitist rather
than majoritarian values. This should come as no surprise to advocates of
devolution, who have long argued that local rather than national government
best represents the will of the people.
Nevertheless, this does suggest that devolution will not ignite a beneficial
regulatory competition that will eventually produce a freer, less regulated
banking system. Advocates of deregulation may have to rethink their strategy
and find better ways of convincing the majority that, in the long run, restrictive
145. See generally Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 1463 (1994).
146. For example, Professor Letsou offers two explanations for why consumer groups might favor
restrictions on coercive collection practices by lenders that actually harm consumer welfare. First, these
groups may incorrectly believe that the benefits of protecting defaulting borrowers outweigh the costs
to consumers who pay their debt and must bear higher interest rates. Second, consumer groups may
share popular anti-bank sentiment. See Letsou, supra note 74, at 629 n.139.
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local financial regulation is to their disadvantage. Federal preemption of state
law and the imposition of uniform national rules may seem to offer a quicker
path to deregulation, but experience has shown that states always find ways to
reassert power over financial institutions. Moreover, it runs counter to the
philosophy of majoritarianism that is a basic tenet of today's conservative
political movement.

